Syria is trapped on a crumbling precipice,
\nand however it might fall will entail significant risks
\nfor the United States and for the Syrian people.<\/p>\n
The brutal regime of Bashar al-Asad is employing its
\nloyal military forces and sectarian thugs to crush the
\nopposition and reassert its tyranny. Even if Bashar
\nfails, Syria may not be out of the woods: an increasingly
\nlikely alternative to the current regime is a
\nbloody civil war similar to what we saw in Lebanon,
\nBosnia, Congo, and most recently in Iraq. The horrors
\nof such a war might even exceed the brutal reassertion
\nof Asad\u2019s control, and would cause spillover
\ninto Syria\u2019s neighbors\u2014Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon,
\nand Israel\u2014that could be disastrous for them
\nand for American interests in the Middle East.<\/p>\n
But the unrest in Syria, which is now entering its second
\nyear, also offers some important opportunities,
\nones that would come from the fall of the regime of
\nBashar al-Asad, whose family has ruled the country
\nwith an iron grip for over forty years. Syria is Iran\u2019s
\noldest and most important ally in the Arab world, and
\nthe Iranian regime has doubled down on Asad, providing
\nhim with financial aid and military support to
\nshore up his regime. Asad\u2019s departure would deal a significant
\nblow to Tehran, further isolating it at a time
\nwhen it has few friends in the region or the world. In
\naddition, Damascus is steadfast in its hostility toward
\nIsrael, and Asad\u2019s regime is also a longtime supporter
\nof terrorist groups like Hizballah and Hamas, and has
\nat times aided al-Qa\u2019ida terrorists and former regime
\nelements in Iraq. The regime\u2019s collapse, therefore,
\ncould have significant benefits for the United States
\nand its allies in the region.<\/p>\n
Actually ousting Asad, however, will not be easy. Although
\nthe Obama administration has for months
\ncalled for Asad to go, every policy option to remove
\nhim is flawed, and some could even make the situation
\nworse\u2014seemingly a recipe for inaction. Doing
\nnothing, however, means standing by while Asad
\nmurders his own people, and Syria plunges into civil
\nwar and risks becoming a failed state. Already the violence
\nis staggering: as of March 2012, at least 8,000
\nSyrians have died and thousands more have been arrested
\nand tortured in trying to topple the regime. At
\nthe same time, Syria is fragmenting. The Syrian opposition
\nremains divided, and the Free Syrian Army
\nis more a brand than a meaningful, unified force. Al-
\nQa\u2019ida is urging fighters to join the fray in Syria, and
\nsectarian killings and atrocities are growing. Should
\nthe violence continue to intensify, Syria\u2019s neighbors
\nmay increase their meddling, and instability could
\nspread, further weakening already-fragile neighbors
\nlike Iraq and Lebanon.<\/p>\n
So to protect U.S. interests, Asad cannot triumph.
\nBut a failed Syria, one wracked by civil war, would be
\njust as bad. Thus, U.S. policy must walk this tightrope,
\ntrying to remove Asad, but doing so in a way
\nthat keeps Syria an intact state capable of policing its
\nborders and ensuring order at home. At the end of
\nthe day, however, removing Asad may not be doable
\nat a price the United States is willing to pay. If so, the
\nU.S. government may be forced to choose between
\nliving with a brutal but weakened Asad or getting rid
\nof Asad regardless of the consequences.<\/p>\n
This memo lays out six options for the United States
\nto consider to achieve Asad\u2019s overthrow, should it
\nchoose to do so:<\/p>\n
The options are complex, and policymakers will probably
\ntry to combine several in an attempt to accentuate
\nthe positives and minimize the negatives, which
\nwill inevitably be difficult and bring out new complications.
\nBut by focusing on discrete approaches, this
\nmemo helps expose their relative strengths and weaknesses.
\nFor each course of action, this memo describes
\nthe strategy inherent to the option and what it would
\nentail in practice. It also assesses the option\u2019s advantages
\nand disadvantages.<\/p>\n
This memo does not endorse any particular policy option.<\/i>
\nRather, it seeks to explain the risks and benefits of
\npossible courses of action at this moment in time. As
\nconditions change, some options may become more
\npractical or desirable and others less so. The authors
\nmostly agree on the advantages and disadvantages
\nof each approach but weigh the relative rewards and
\ncosts differently.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":34058,"template":"","class_list":["post-34057","research","type-research","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","entry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/research\/34057","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/research"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/research"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/34058"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=34057"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}