{"id":466785,"date":"2013-11-24T07:22:46","date_gmt":"2013-11-24T07:22:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mecouncil.org\/?p=466785"},"modified":"2022-09-21T06:34:11","modified_gmt":"2022-09-21T06:34:11","slug":"to-win-arab-trust-on-iran-washington-should-broaden-scope-of-final-deal","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/to-win-arab-trust-on-iran-washington-should-broaden-scope-of-final-deal\/","title":{"rendered":"To Win Arab Trust On Iran, Washington Should Broaden Scope Of Final Deal"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>For Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, this was never really about Iran\u2019s nuclear program. They will judge the <a class=\"js-external-link\" href=\"http:\/\/m.whitehouse.gov\/the-press-office\/2013\/11\/23\/fact-sheet-first-step-understandings-regarding-islamic-republic-iran-s-n\">interim deal <\/a>on the basis of whether it strengthens Iran\u2019s regional position\u00a0\u2014 which it almost certainly will. Their basic assumption is that whatever\u2019s good for Iran will, somehow, come at their expense. For them (but not for the United States), this is a zero-sum game, so, by definition, this is a bad deal.<\/p>\n<p>Just two years ago, analysts were pointing to Iran\u2019s decline, which found itself increasingly isolated. Despite its claims to the contrary, the Iranian regime had failed to take advantage of the Arab uprisings; its faithful support of a brutal Assad regime was plain for all to see. Assad\u2019s days seemed numbered, anyhow, as Western officials were fond of saying. Iran has recovered nicely. This interim deal\u00a0\u2014 coming so soon after Hassan Rouhani\u2019s surprise victory\u00a0\u2014 continues to undo the damage, strengthening Iran\u2019s economic state at home and rehabilitating the country in the eyes of the international community.<\/p>\n<p>This brings us to Syria and it could conceivably go in one of two directions. An optimist might argue that Iran\u2019s staunch support of the Assad regime is a product of its isolation. Having less to lose, it sticks with its allies and it only has two or three, one of them being Syria. Perhaps this interim deal addresses some of that insecurity and Iran starts to play a less destructive role in the Syrian conflict. I suppose this is plausible but probably only in the longer run\u00a0\u2014 after a comprehensive deal is secured. For now, Iran has no real incentive to distance itself from Assad. That would be premature after all\u00a0\u2014 what if the negotiations fail and the interim deal falls apart?<\/p>\n<p>The United States, meanwhile, is even less likely\u00a0\u2014 or just as unlikely as it was before\u00a0\u2014 to put serious pressure on Iran over its support of the Assad regime. That simply isn\u2019t the American focus right now and anything that could potentially complicate the coming negotiations is likely to be put to the side. Assad was already\u00a0<a class=\"js-external-link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/international\/archive\/2013\/09\/the-us-russian-deal-on-syria-a-victory-for-assad\/279680\/\">given a free hand<\/a> with the U.S.-Russia chemical weapons deal in September. He had now <a class=\"js-external-link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/international\/archive\/2013\/10\/syrias-most-important-rebels-are-islamists-and-we-have-to-work-with-them-anyway\/280381\/\">become a partner<\/a>, rather than an enemy, even if that meant to looking the other way as the rebels struggled to respond to Assad\u2019s military offensives.<\/p>\n<p>It is understandable that the interim deal with Iran, which was complicated enough, had little to say about Syria. But any final, comprehensive deal should, in fact, be comprehensive. That means addressing Iran as well as Hezbollah\u2019s crucial support for the Assad regime. The Obama administration, however, has not done a great job of adopting an approach that views the region\u2019s seemingly disparate conflicts as not just inter-linked but intertwined. Doing so would require a coherent regional strategy rather than the boutique approach that they have so far favored.<\/p>\n<p>At the end of the day, skeptics (rightly) fear that the administration\u2019s two top priorities\u00a0\u2014 Iran\u2019s nuclear ambitions and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process\u00a0\u2014 are priorities for a reason. If the Iranian problem, in all its various forms, is resolved, that gives the United States one less fundamental national security threat to worry about. If one wanted to be <a class=\"js-external-link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2013\/10\/27\/world\/middleeast\/rice-offers-a-more-modest-strategy-for-mideast.html\">less consumed by the Middle East <\/a>and refocus attention on other neglected regions, then this would presumably be a solid first step. Of course, that\u2019s exactly what the Gulf countries\u00a0\u2014 as well as Israel\u00a0\u2014 are worried about.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>For Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, this was never really about Iran\u2019s nuclear program. They will judge the interim deal on the basis of whether it strengthens Iran\u2019s regional position\u00a0\u2014 which it almost certainly will. Their basic assumption is that whatever\u2019s good for Iran will, somehow, come at their expense. For them (but&hellip; <a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/to-win-arab-trust-on-iran-washington-should-broaden-scope-of-final-deal\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">To Win Arab Trust On Iran, Washington Should Broaden Scope Of Final Deal<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":466786,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"publication_archive_type":[297],"class_list":["post-466785","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized","publication_archive_type-issue-brief","entry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/466785","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=466785"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/466785\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":466788,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/466785\/revisions\/466788"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/466786"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=466785"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=466785"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=466785"},{"taxonomy":"publication_archive_type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publication_archive_type?post=466785"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}