{"id":466648,"date":"2015-05-01T11:24:54","date_gmt":"2015-05-01T11:24:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mecouncil.org\/?p=466648"},"modified":"2022-09-20T18:18:18","modified_gmt":"2022-09-20T18:18:18","slug":"india-v-china-in-sri-lanka-lessons-for-rising-powers","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/india-v-china-in-sri-lanka-lessons-for-rising-powers\/","title":{"rendered":"India v. China in Sri Lanka\u2014Lessons for rising powers"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>John Kerry\u2019s visit to Sri Lanka, the first by a secretary of state in 11 years, recognizes the country\u2019s geopolitical importance. It also highlights the outcome of the recent tussle over the island state by two emerging global powers, a contest in which India has gained the upper hand over China. The struggle provides important lessons for rising powers as they begin a \u2018Great Game\u2019 in Asia.<\/p>\n<p>Sri Lanka sits at the heart of the Indian Ocean, adjacent to major shipping routes, within the world\u2019s most dynamic region\u2014the Indo-Pacific. Long described as the \u2018pearl of the Indian Ocean,\u2019 Sri Lanka was, up until the January election defeat of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, drifting out of India\u2019s orbit and increasingly seen as part of China\u2019s \u2018string of pearls.\u2019 But while growing economic links correlating with China\u2019s rise change little regardless of who is president of Sri Lanka, politically, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi\u2019s government was able to snatch back this pearl from Beijing\u2019s string.<\/p>\n<p>While Sri Lanka\u2019s people voted out a government that happened to be Beijing-friendly, it wasn\u2019t foregone that its successor should be this pro-New Delhi. And though it does not prove whether Delhi or Beijing is the more astute strategist, and while acknowledging India\u2019s inherent geographical advantages regarding Sri Lanka, the Modi government\u2019s deft diplomacy provides important lessons. These are the same lessons that a century ago, a rising United States learnt from existing superpower Britain. This includes the importance of sharpening the two main foreign policy tools\u2014insight and influence. This is relevant for Beijing: that its \u2018tried and true\u2019 blunt instruments of the trade\/investment carrot and the military force stick, cannot succeed alone.<\/p>\n<p>Colombo\u2019s backslide toward Delhi began during Sri Lanka\u2019s 2014 election campaign. The opposition used allegedly corrupt deals made between Rajapaksa and Beijing as a campaign tool. This already suggests a public relations defeat for the People\u2019s Republic.<\/p>\n<p>Following its election win, the new Sri Lankan government touted the strengthening of ties with India, and made little effort to conceal the shift away from China.<\/p>\n<p>This is a particularly acute failure for China given that Beijing had a powerful story it could have told the Sri Lankan public. Namely, that China was there when no one else was. The civil war between Sri Lanka\u2019s government and Tamil Tiger rebels was Asia\u2019s longest. Governments came and went. The pivotal factor in Colombo\u2019s ultimate victory over the Tamil Tigers was not domestic (though the 2005 tsunami played a role). It was external: the rise of China.<\/p>\n<p>Even hawkish Sri Lankan governments had been hamstrung in pursuing a definitive victory against the Tigers, due to fear of upsetting the West, which insisted upon adherence to human rights and international law in the conduct of war. If not, trade and aid levers might be pulled, harming Sri Lanka\u2019s economy and a government\u2019s chance of re-election.<\/p>\n<p>When China emerged as a major economic power willing and able to step into any void left by the West, it allowed Rajapaksa freedom in prosecuting the war. Beijing provided lethal military equipment and post-war diplomatic support that Delhi wouldn\u2019t. The ending of the war remains a major issue in the national psyche, and for the majority of Sri Lankans, Rajapaksa\u2019s greatest achievement.<\/p>\n<p>In contrast, India\u2019s reputation in Sri Lanka regarding the war ranges from mixed to negative: from Tamils with painful memories of Indian peacekeepers fighting the Tigers, to Sinhalese who blame India for training the Tigers and then preventing their defeat in 1987.<\/p>\n<p>How then, did India attain a better image than China? It may be partly due to Delhi\u2019s cultural diplomacy, underpinned by \u2018in-country insight.\u2019 During Modi\u2019s visit, he garnered favor with Sri Lanka\u2019s Sinhalese majority by visiting and worshipping at Buddhist holy sites. This continued the \u2018Buddhism diplomacy\u2019 employed in his \u2018act East\u2019 approach, reaching out to Buddhist neighbors.<\/p>\n<p>Emphasizing India\u2019s Buddhist history and positioning himself as a representative of \u2018all of Indian culture\u2019 is not unexpected from this devoutly Hindu prime minister. The Hindutva movement, from which Modi arose, has long described themselves as the vanguard of all what they consider Indian heritage.<\/p>\n<p>Modi also visited the island\u2019s Tamil cultural heartland. \u00a0Showing his commitment to Tamil welfare helped him to endear himself to both Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils. Knowing that Sri Lankans often suspect that India\u2019s Tamil-Nadu state controls Delhi\u2019s Sri Lanka policy, Modi has tried to claw back policy control and reclaim the narrative; highlighting that ancient Indo-Lankan ties stretch deeper than the war.<\/p>\n<p>If China is to influence smaller states, it needs to develop deep insight of these states within its foreign policy institutions. In Sri Lanka, Beijing also could have tapped into Buddhism. It could have considered the analyses of ancient India\u2019s Machiavelli, Kautilya, which seem to have played out in modern South Asia.<\/p>\n<p>China should have known Sri Lanka\u2019s history of civil society and the risks of pursuing deals perceived as corrupt. Beijing could have helped Rajapaksa emphasize that China invested in projects which India declined, and promote investments which are visible to ordinary Sri Lankans, like infrastructure.<\/p>\n<p>Delhi\u2019s ability to attract Colombo was also due to its ability to influence. Rajapaksa has claimed that India\u2019s spy agency helped organize opposition groups before the election. Delhi denies this. True or not, India seems to have trumped China in cultivating stronger ties with key power nodes within Sri Lankan society. Beijing could have used investments to strengthen links with the business elite. It could have supported rural nationalists in leveraging suspicion of India to paint the Opposition as \u2018traitors\u2019\u2014a tag which was pivotal in earlier opposition defeats.<\/p>\n<p>Both tools\u2014insight and influence\u2014require tapping into a diverse domestic foreign policy community across government departments, think-tanks and universities. To take full advantage, Delhi and Beijing must use the best advice the pool provides, not just advice from those most loyal. The sharpest evidence-based analyses and predictive capabilities should be rewarded. The fact that such a meritocracy was utilized more by the only remaining superpower than its now vanquished opponent should be something rising powers take note of.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>John Kerry\u2019s visit to Sri Lanka, the first by a secretary of state in 11 years, recognizes the country\u2019s geopolitical importance. It also highlights the outcome of the recent tussle over the island state by two emerging global powers, a contest in which India has gained the upper hand over China. The struggle provides important&hellip; <a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/india-v-china-in-sri-lanka-lessons-for-rising-powers\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">India v. China in Sri Lanka\u2014Lessons for rising powers<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":466649,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"publication_archive_type":[297],"class_list":["post-466648","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized","publication_archive_type-issue-brief","entry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/466648","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=466648"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/466648\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":466651,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/466648\/revisions\/466651"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/466649"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=466648"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=466648"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=466648"},{"taxonomy":"publication_archive_type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publication_archive_type?post=466648"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}