When people think of India\u2019s role in the Middle East, they largely see Delhi as a benign power that steers clear of security issues and focuses on exporting labor and importing oil. For much of history, this was true. Over recent years, however, things have changed. India is beginning to think and act more strategically.
\nDuring most of the period since India\u2019s independence, India-Middle East relations centered on economic ties. Political relations were largely defined by Cold War allegiances and antagonism with Pakistan. The economic focus is understandable given the Middle East has been key to India\u2019s prosperity.
\nTrade with the GCC countries was $137.7 billion\u00a0in 2014-2015, having grown from $5.5 billion\u00a0in 2001. By 2015, India and China were becoming the most critical trade and investment partners for the GCC. An important component of this is the labor trade with millions of Indians working in the region. In 2015-2016, remittances from Indian workers in the GCC were $35.9 billion.
\nIn the last decade or so, several factors have raised the strategic stakes for India. Firstly, existing pillars of the relationship (such as energy trade) have taken on greater strategic significance. There is growing expectation among policymakers that India will eventually become a global strategic power. With oil being particularly important for military power projection, India\u2019s already growing dependence on Middle Eastern energy assumes a more strategic dimension.
\nIndia\u2019s net oil imports as a percentage of demand grew from 42 percent in 1990 to an estimated 71 percent in 2012. By 2016, over half of India\u2019s oil and gas was imported from the Gulf. During prime minister Narendra Modi\u2019s visit to Saudi Arabia, the two countries agreed to transform the buyer-seller relationship into a deeper strategic partnership. The joint statement from the visit explicitly linked expanding trade ties to enhanced strategic engagement. Simultaneously, Delhi is making strategic investments in Riyadh\u2019s rival Iran, namely in the Chabahar Port.
\nSecondly, India\u2019s security aspirations are growing in what it sees as its extended neighborhood including the Indian Ocean. A 2013 poll found that 94 percent of Indians feel their country should have the most powerful navy in the Indian Ocean, and that 89 percent believe that India should do more to lead cooperation in the region. Security ties with Middle East states are important to this. India\u2019s growing international trade further increases the importance of protecting sea lanes from the Middle East. Since 2000, both Congress and BJP administrations have stated the Middle East is strategically interrelated to South Asia. India\u2019s maritime doctrine of 2009 states that the Gulf and Arabian Sea are vital to India\u2019s interests, including securing choke points.
\nThirdly, Indian policymakers are concerned about increasing instability and the weakening of states in the Middle East which threatens Indian energy imports and diaspora. India\u2019s past inability to influence geopolitics in the Middle East, combined with its lack of security presence, led to costly evacuations of its diaspora. This included the largest evacuation in history, when 200,000 Indians were airlifted out of Kuwait during the Gulf War.
\nThe fourth and perhaps most important factor is increased multi-polarity in the Middle East, with the long-term decline of American influence providing more room for others. Under Barack Obama, Washington tried to pivot away from the region. Even with Donald Trump\u2019s about face on Syria, public fatigue towards interventionism will influence the political calculus. This is already seen in the post-Syria strikes revolt among Mr Trump\u2019s supporters who had voted for the anti-interventionist tendencies that helped to define his campaign.
\nConcurrently, non-Western powers are ratcheting up their geopolitical presence. Russia is using its role in Syria as leverage in relations with Western allies such as the Gulf States. Of greater interest to India is that China is translating its massive economic relationship into strategic ties.
\nBeijing sees the Middle East as part of the trade routes it seeks to secure from East Asia, through to Africa and Europe. China is positioning itself as a less judgmental alternative to America. It has signed security agreements with friends of America such as Saudi Arabia, in addition to providing diplomatic protection to rivals such as Iran.
\nChina\u2019s entry furthers the Middle East\u2019s strategic relevance to India. It drives Delhi to increase its own influence and avoid Beijing having leverage over its energy security and being encircled by Chinese allies.
\nIn response to these emerging factors, there has been a massive increase in activity. Mr Modi\u2019s Middle East focused Link West policy agenda has evolved into “think West” with a plethora of bilateral visits. In recent years, Delhi signed security and defense agreements with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Qatar. Concurrently, with regards to Syria, Delhi (like Beijing) has provided somewhat muted support to Bashar Al Assad, positioning itself somewhere between the West and Russia. As the United States contemplates its strategic options in a rapidly changing region, India\u2019s growing role may prove one that cannot be ignored.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
When people think of India\u2019s role in the Middle East, they largely see Delhi as a benign power that steers clear of security issues and focuses on exporting labor and importing oil. For much of history, this was true. Over recent years, however, things have changed. India is beginning to think and act more strategically.… Continue reading India\u2019s shifting role in the Middle East<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":399493,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"publication_archive_type":[297],"class_list":["post-399468","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized","publication_archive_type-issue-brief","entry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/399468","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=399468"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/399468\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":463505,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/399468\/revisions\/463505"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/399493"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=399468"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=399468"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=399468"},{"taxonomy":"publication_archive_type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publication_archive_type?post=399468"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}