{"id":466462,"date":"2022-09-17T12:21:00","date_gmt":"2022-09-17T12:21:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mecouncil.org\/?post_type=event&p=466462"},"modified":"2022-09-17T12:22:01","modified_gmt":"2022-09-17T12:22:01","slug":"north-africa-new-elections-old-problems","status":"publish","type":"event","link":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/event\/north-africa-new-elections-old-problems\/","title":{"rendered":"North Africa: New Elections, Old Problems?"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Since the 2011 uprisings, North Africa has\u00a0<\/span>endured<\/span>\u00a0a\u00a0<\/span>period of significant transformation<\/span>,<\/span>\u00a0characterized by socioeconomic and security challenges that continue to affect the internal and external dynamics of each\u00a0<\/span>country<\/span>.\u00a0<\/span>In Tunisia, many<\/span>\u00a0citizens<\/span>\u00a0are<\/span>\u00a0anxious about the current political and economic situation, even as they remain<\/span>\u00a0hopeful about the elections set to take place at the end of\u00a0<\/span>2019<\/span>. In Algeria, the remarkably peaceful\u00a0<\/span>recent\u00a0<\/span>protests have demonstrated the significant role played by the\u00a0<\/span>country\u2019s<\/span>\u00a0youth and how transition can begin to take place with<\/span>out causing major instability. Meanwhile, a<\/span>s tensions escalate in Libya, concerns about how this conflict could destabilize the wider region are growing.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

These events\u00a0<\/span>are driving a<\/span>\u00a0crucial\u00a0<\/span>transitional phase<\/span>\u00a0that will define the future of the region<\/span>, shaping the domest<\/span>ic politics of each country and their\u00a0<\/span>international relations<\/span>.\u00a0<\/span>Overall, while many challenges remain, North Africa\u2019s human capital and its strategic location<\/span>\u00a0have the potential to create a bright future for the region and its Mediterranean neighbors.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This roundtable reflected on\u00a0<\/span>the\u00a0<\/span>current\u00a0<\/span>political and economic<\/span>\u00a0situation<\/span>\u00a0in North Africa, with the aim of\u00a0<\/span>coming up with new approaches to the challenges faced in three countries: Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia. The event was organized into four sessions, focusing on\u00a0<\/span>each of the three countries<\/span>\u00a0and the\u00a0<\/span>future outlook<\/span>\u00a0for the region, respectively. It took place within the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogues (MED) initiative and was the first event of its kind to be held in Doha, Qatar.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Session One: Algeria<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Events in Algeria are still unfolding, and it is difficult to analyze and predict what<\/span>\u00a0will<\/span>\u00a0happen next.\u00a0<\/span>Taking that uncertainty into account<\/span>, this session examined drivers<\/span>\u00a0and features<\/span>\u00a0of the<\/span>\u00a0recent<\/span>\u00a0protest<\/span>s<\/span>,<\/span>\u00a0as well as how the movement is likely to evolve.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

T<\/span>he participants<\/span>\u00a0pointed out<\/span>\u00a0that the protests have been\u00a0<\/span>nationwide, festive, and peaceful<\/span>, with a unified set of demands<\/span>, including:<\/span>\u00a0the refusal of a fifth term for<\/span>\u00a0President Abdelaziz Bouteflika;\u00a0<\/span>the rejection of\u00a0<\/span>Bouteflika<\/span>\u2019s<\/span>\u00a0allies;\u00a0<\/span>and\u00a0<\/span>the<\/span>\u00a0need<\/span>\u00a0for a genuine political transition.\u00a0<\/span>They urged against analyzing the movement\u00a0<\/span>within<\/span>\u00a0an \u201cArab Spring\u201d framework, as\u00a0<\/span>this<\/span>\u00a0creates blind spots. Rather, they argued that many Algerians view the movement as \u201cfinishing the revolution\u201d that was started by their parents.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

They also\u00a0<\/span>noted\u00a0<\/span>that the army has maintained power, but<\/span>\u00a0that<\/span>\u00a0it is unclear whether it wants to govern.\u00a0<\/span>One participant\u00a0<\/span>said<\/span>\u00a0that the<\/span>\u00a0army\u00a0<\/span>currently<\/span>\u00a0has three choices: to contain the protests,\u00a0<\/span>undertake a<\/span>\u00a0coup, or pursue an extraconstitutional route that is led and supported by the military.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The\u00a0<\/span>discussants<\/span>\u00a0argued<\/span>\u00a0that the Algerian opposition is\u00a0<\/span>fragmented because the regime has been succe<\/span>ssful in co<\/span>opting and controlling political parties. However, the current protest movement has clearly shown that the model of a democratic fa\u00e7ade does not work.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

They added that\u00a0<\/span>the\u00a0<\/span>movement\u00a0<\/span>is\u00a0<\/span>only in the initial stages of<\/span>\u00a0establishing its leadership. There are debates over who could play this role, and some of the names being mentioned are close to the regime<\/span>, which is li<\/span>kely to stir pushback from<\/span>\u00a0protesters<\/span>.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The discussion also dealt with the question of whether Algeria\u2019s current economic situation could affect its ability to handle a major political transition. Some participants argued that there is a burgeoning economic crisis tied to falling foreign reserves, rising youth unemployment, and overdependence on hydrocarbons, while others argued that the situation is not so dire, citing the country\u2019s\u00a0<\/span>efforts at economic diversification and relatively high<\/span>\u00a0current<\/span>\u00a0level of foreign reserves.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Participants\u00a0<\/span>considered<\/span>\u00a0the various acts of civil disobedience that have taken place so far, and how these acts could help expand protesters\u2019 power.\u00a0<\/span>Several<\/span>\u00a0participants expressed concern that holding elections in July 2019 would be detrimental to the transition process, as the regime and its allies\u00a0<\/span>could<\/span>\u00a0use the elections to coopt the transition.<\/span>\u00a0With respect to what role international actors might be able to play, most participants agreed that foreign intervention would not help the movement.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Session Two: Libya<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The\u00a0<\/span>conflict<\/span>\u00a0in Libya<\/span>\u00a0has<\/span>\u00a0developed<\/span>\u00a0quickly\u00a0<\/span>over the past few<\/span>\u00a0weeks and there is a lack of reliable information about wh<\/span>at is happening on the ground.\u00a0<\/span>While acknowledging these factors<\/span>, t<\/span>his session analyzed the causes and dynamics of the current\u00a0<\/span>conflict, and<\/span>\u00a0considered how events are likely to unfold.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Several<\/span>\u00a0participants noted that\u00a0<\/span>Khalifa\u00a0<\/span>Haftar does not have the necessary military force to overtake\u00a0<\/span>Tripoli<\/span>, having miscalculated the size of the counteroffensive and the likelihood that armed groups would flip to his side. However, they also suggested that Haftar can no longer retreat\u00a0<\/span>for fear of<\/span>\u00a0political repercussions,\u00a0<\/span>making<\/span>\u00a0him especially dangerous.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Some participants also wondered whether Haftar\u2019s calculations about\u00a0<\/span>the Tripoli offensive<\/span>\u00a0will be<\/span>\u00a0affected by his interest in running for elections, or his allegedly poor health.\u00a0<\/span>They also pointed out that Haftar<\/span>\u00a0is in a position where he is running low on cash and in charge of a shaky alliance.<\/span>\u00a0Another participant said that there is a risk that Haftar could face challenges to<\/span>\u00a0his authority in the E<\/span>ast, due to tensions in his camp<\/span>\u00a0there<\/span>.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

With respect to the role of the international community<\/span>, one participant noted that more international actors were surprised by Haftar\u2019s offensive than should have been the case, due to wishful thinking regarding his intentions.\u00a0<\/span>Other participants<\/span>\u00a0argued that a limited response from the international community\u00a0<\/span>could<\/span>\u00a0embolden Haftar to continue his offensive,\u00a0<\/span>potentially leading to a long period of conflict.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

One participant\u00a0<\/span>argued that establishing a ceasefire is becoming increasingly difficult<\/span>, but<\/span>\u00a0that<\/span>\u00a0a U.N. resolution could eventually lead to a diplomatic solution,\u00a0<\/span>adding that<\/span>\u00a0there are some forces already moving toward such a resolution.<\/span>\u00a0Another participant\u00a0<\/span>proposed<\/span>\u00a0that the situation in Libya<\/span>\u00a0be understood<\/span>\u00a0as a proxy war\u00a0<\/span>among<\/span>\u00a0competing Gulf\u00a0<\/span>States<\/span>.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Participants<\/span>\u00a0pointed out<\/span>\u00a0that Egypt plays a key role in Libya, which it perceives as a threat to its security and economic interest<\/span>s<\/span>, as well as a potential energy purchaser.<\/span>\u00a0They<\/span>\u00a0also discussed the various roles and interests of the United S<\/span>tates, Russia, France, and Italy, and especially the competition between\u00a0<\/span>the latter two states<\/span>\u00a0and its deleterious effects on\u00a0<\/span>Libya.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Several participants<\/span>\u00a0noted that\u00a0<\/span>Libyans are extremely polarized in their opinions of Haftar,\u00a0<\/span>with one\u00a0<\/span>participant\u00a0<\/span>claiming that\u00a0<\/span>a silent majority is skeptical of all parties<\/span>\u00a0and that this majority\u00a0<\/span>could<\/span>\u00a0be\u00a0<\/span>a<\/span>\u00a0center of gravity\u00a0<\/span>around which to build peace<\/span>.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Session Three: Tunisia<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In this session, participants looked back at the successes and failures of the past eight years in Tunisia. They then considered the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in 2019 and how\u00a0<\/span>these<\/span>\u00a0might<\/span>\u00a0affect the status of democracy in the country.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The discussion started off with<\/span>\u00a0a review of Tunisia\u2019s history, with participants remarking that recent years have seen Tunisians become disenchanted by the gap between their post-2011 expectations and the realities of the political transition.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

With respect to politics, the participants\u00a0<\/span>noted<\/span>\u00a0that, while Tunisia had the oldest constitution in the Arab world, its political history prior to 2011 was not characterized by a multi-party process.\u00a0<\/span>They also said that, f<\/span>ollowing the\u00a0<\/span>2011 transition<\/span>, Tunisia<\/span>n<\/span>\u00a0politics came to be characterized by:\u00a0<\/span>an electorate\u00a0<\/span>that is\u00a0<\/span>d<\/span>isappointed\u00a0<\/span>by the<\/span>\u00a0elected parties;\u00a0<\/span>a dispute about the\u00a0<\/span>nature of citizenship;\u00a0<\/span>and the absence of a constitutional court.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

One participant said that the upcoming elections are expected to usher in a new power-sharing agr<\/span>eement among political parties.\u00a0<\/span>They questioned how well the current party system is working,\u00a0<\/span>in light of<\/span>\u00a0the past coalition\u2019s failure and stressed that Tunisians\u2019 2011 demands must be addressed more proactively in order to safeguard the country\u2019s democratic trajectory.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Another participant questioned the success of the transition, noting the\u00a0<\/span>frequency of strikes and protests across classes and across the country<\/span>,<\/span>\u00a0resulting<\/span>\u00a0from<\/span>\u00a0a lack of trust in the dysfunctional political system<\/span>.\u00a0<\/span>They<\/span>\u00a0pointed out that the current system is comprised of\u00a0<\/span>a political elite\u00a0<\/span>with connections to<\/span>\u00a0Habib\u00a0<\/span>Bourguiba\u00a0<\/span>and Zine al-<\/span>Abidine<\/span>\u00a0Ben Ali.\u00a0<\/span>This\u00a0<\/span>situation\u00a0<\/span>has led some Tunisians to say that Ben Ali\u2019s regime is back, but in a more dangerous\u00a0<\/span>form<\/span>.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

With respect to economics, one speaker argued that the situation has not changed much since 2011. The economy has continued to be dominated by oligopolistic families and corruption, resulting in\u00a0<\/span>continued<\/span>\u00a0polarization, protests, and strikes.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

On a separate note, participants discussed how one beneficial outcome of the 2011 uprisings was the\u00a0<\/span>disengagement of the international community.\u00a0<\/span>That being said, China<\/span>\u00a0has shown increasing\u00a0<\/span>economic\u00a0<\/span>interest in\u00a0<\/span>the country<\/span>.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

They added that\u00a0<\/span>Tunisians\u00a0<\/span>have become increasingly concerned about their neighboring countries in recent months. The government\u2019s attempt to secure\u00a0<\/span>the<\/span>\u00a0country\u2019s borders with Libya ha<\/span>s harmed the informal economy. Meanwhile, T<\/span>unisians are\u00a0<\/span>observing<\/span>\u00a0the\u00a0<\/span>current movement<\/span>\u00a0in Algeria, with many of them\u00a0<\/span>hoping<\/span>\u00a0that it will<\/span>\u00a0result in better outcomes<\/span>\u00a0than those\u00a0<\/span>seen\u00a0<\/span>in their country.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span>Session Four: The Future Outlook<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In this session,\u00a0<\/span>participants<\/span>\u00a0discussed the recent protests at the regional level and speculated about what might happen next in Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

One participant noted that there are five structural issues facing North African countries: 1) the pursuit of stability through ballots; 2) the role of external actors, including the oversized influence\u00a0<\/span>of the Gulf and Europe; 3) elections for the sake of elections; 4) the inability of street protests to translate into formal politics; and\u00a0<\/span>5)\u00a0<\/span>the lack of economic vision and alternatives.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Another participant argued that protests have been the defining characteristic of the Arab world in recent years, but that the issue is that protesters are only able to define what they do not want, rather than what they do. They added that the Arab world\u00a0<\/span>should<\/span>\u00a0stop hoping for leaders to emerge<\/span>,<\/span>\u00a0and instead focus on designing institutions.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Participants<\/span>\u00a0also discussed the intellectual gap in the region<\/span>\u00a0and the difficulty of imagining new ideologies or social contracts when citizens are punished for speaking out about\u00a0<\/span>existing<\/span>\u00a0challenges<\/span>.\u00a0<\/span>One participant stressed the need<\/span>\u00a0to understand the recent protests at the regional level, in order to learn from the mistakes of the past and to understand the constraints\u00a0<\/span>facing<\/span>\u00a0each country.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Another participant claimed that the problem in North Africa is not elections per se, as these can tell us a lot about social contract issues. Rather, the problem is that elections can be legal without being legitimate, and therefore do not tell us much about democracy.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

However,\u00a0<\/span>one<\/span>\u00a0participant argued that we should guard against the idea of exceptionalism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, focusing instead on the \u201chorizontalization\u201d of power.<\/span>\u00a0Building on this, another participant wondered whether horizontal mobilization translates into leadership, stressing that the MENA region desperately needs intellectual leaders to emerge.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","class_list":["post-466462","event","type-event","status-publish","hentry","entry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/event\/466462","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/event"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/event"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mecouncil-afkar.fuegodigitalmedia.qa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=466462"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}